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ABSTRACT
This project is an experimental implementation of Multi-Level Security
(MLS) lattice model by using semantic web technologies (OWL) to create and
test Mandatory Access Control (MAC) with Bell-LaPadula (BLP) properties.
Semantic web (web of data) is building on top of the World Wide Web (web of
documents), aiming to make data machine-readable so that to improve data
processing and management. OWL is a semantic web computational logic-base
language which is designed to represent complex knowledge in semantic format.
With the MLS ontology, we are able to define dominance relationship between
variables within the lattice model and perform different queries to verify if the
subject (with security clearance) can access (read/write) to the object (with
security classification). Moreover, by leveraging BLP properties, the ontology
would only allow information to flow from entities with lower classification to
entities with higher classification.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

Research Motivation
Web development has never stopped since the birth of the Internet in
1962. To look back from these days, it requires users to have expert knowledge
for accessing information through the Internet. In the 1990s, the founder of the
World Wide Web, Sir Tim Berners-Lee, invented the World Wide Web and wrote
the three fundamental technologies of the web, HTML, URI and HTTP. In
addition, with the invention of search engines to form today’s digital world that
enables normal people to access the information on the web without any expert
knowledge. In the past 20 years, the rapid growth of web technologies upgraded
the web to a data centered processing age, in which users become the
mainstream in data generation through broadcasting and social networking.
Berners-Lee, Hendler and Lassila (2001) first discussed their vision of the web in
the future. They discussed that the current web is the foundation of semantic
web. It’s goal is to apply semantic meaning to the web to make data machinereadable and develop new technologies to better store, process and express
knowledge with large volume of data.
Some parts of the vision have already come true. Semantic web
technologies have been used in the healthcare industry and artificial intelligence
for knowledge modeling. Meanwhile, information security is always a critical
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topic. Throughout the years, cybersecurity professionals are aware of the
challenges brought by new web technologies such as cloud computing, big data,
Internet of Things, etc. The security threats are not only coming from the Internet,
but also from the internal environment. Case studies such as Marriott Data
Breach (Sanger et al., 2018) and US Office of Personnel Management (Thomas,
2019) proved that design and maintaining the security of information systems is
the priority for both private and government agencies. Organizations have the
obligation to collect, process, store and share sensitive data in a secure manner.
For example, health care information of patients, top secret military resources
and personal identity information should all be protected because data breach
can cause huge financial loss to individuals and organizations as well as
increase national security issues. Multi-level security policy (MLS) is prevalent in
military systems, and further enforced on their contractors and partners. The
increasing security threats from both internal and external environments also
lead a lot of organizations to embrace to the MLS in order to raise their security
profile. Each uses access control to require pre-authorized user privileges to gain
access to the designated information according to the classification of the data.
While the web is extending in a semantic manner, some questions came
to mind. Security measures should be implemented in every layer of the web
environment. When the data are formalized with semantic meaning, what kind of
security measures can be used to protect the data in a semantic environment?
Even though no study shows a semantic version of MLS implementation, if it is
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possible to implement the MLS policy in this environment? Hence, I think there
are emerging needs to upgrade the access control policies while adopting new
web technologies within the organization. Therefore, the security policies should
also make an extension to enforce information security management in the
semantic web environment.

Organization
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Chapter 2
summarizes the past studies on MLS and provides a brief introduction of the
semantic web. Chapter 3 demonstrates how the MLS lattice model is constructed
by using Protégé, and Chapter 4 discusses how to use semantic web rule
language to apply dominance rules in the ontology. In conclusion, Chapter 5
summarizes the work accomplished in this project and discusses areas for future
development.
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CHAPTER TWO
BACKGROUND

Mandatory Access Control
Defined by the National Institute of Standards and Technology(NIST), the
Mandatory access control (MAC) is a type of nondiscretionary access control
that enforces a uniform security level to all subjects and objects in an information
system. (“Mandatory Access Control”, n.d.) To prevent the information flow from
a subject must be authorized (with security clearance) to access an object (with
security classification). Past research shows that MAC is closely related to MultiLevel Security (MLS). MLS is first proposed by the defense community to
maximize the protection of sensitive and confidential information. (43.6. MultiLevel Security(MLS), n.d.) It is widely used in the defense industry, especially in
the military system and government with higher levels of security than those in
private business and organizations. In addition, MLS uses the Bell-LaPadula
(BLP) model to prevent confidential information flow from higher level to lower
level with the need-to-know requirement. (Kim, 2020) According to Bell (2005),
Denning (1976) introduced a lattice structure, Bell-LaPadular (BLP) model, to
compare the security levels of user clearance and information classification.
Within a large and complex information system, sensitivity level it is not
flexible enough to classify the information sensitivity and user clearance. The
BLP model uses additional information known as a compartment (also called
4

category or need to know) to specify MLS security labels or levels. An MLS
security level or label is a sensitivity level or a pair of a sensitivity level and a set
of compartments. In this project, we use a colon to separate a sensitivity level
and a set of compartments when defining a security level or label in concept.
(Elliott,1990; van Tilborg, Jajodia, 2011) A few examples of security levels are
TopSecret:{bio,chem}, Secret:{}, and Unclassified:{nuke,bio}.
Dominance Rule
An MLS system has a dominance rule that defines a partial order (≤) over
the MLS security levels. The partial ordering (≤) is always defined such that two
security levels can be compared for dominance:
Given two security levels l1 with sensitivity level S1 and compartment
C1, and l2 with sensitivity level S2 and compartment C2. We write l1 ≤ l2,
meaning l1 is dominated by (is less than) l2 or l2 dominates (is greater than) l1
when
•

S2 is equal to or higher than S1

•

C1 is a subset of C2, namely, C1 ⊆ C2

BLP Security Policy (Bell, 2005)
The BLP security policies enforce that every subject and object must have
at least one security label. To block information flow from entities with higher
sensitivity level to ones with lower sensitivity level within the information system,
two important properties are proposed: simple security property and star property
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(Figure 2.1).

Figure 2.1. Left side: without BLP properties information can flow from high to
low. The simple security condition would prevent low from reading high. The star
property would prevent high from writing to low. Right side: with BLP properties
information can only flow from low to high.

Simple Security Policy
Also known as the “no read-up” policy of the BLP model states that a
subject with certain security clearance cannot read an object with a higher
classification. Therefore, given the subject’s security label sl(S) and the object’s
security label sl(O), the subject can read the object when
sl(O) ≤ sl(S)
Example 1. Assuming Alice is granted a security clearance TS:{bio},
namely, sl(Alice) =TS:{bio} and the object O1 has the security classification

6

TS:{bio, chem}, namely, sl(O1) = TS:{bio, chem}. {bio} is a subset of {bio, chem}.
Then, Alice cannot read O1 as sl(Alice) ≤ sl(O1).

* (Star) Property
Also known as the “no write-down” policy states that a subject with certain
security clearance cannot write to any object with a lower security classification.
Therefore, given the subject’s security label sl(S) and the object’s security label
sl(O), the subject can write the object when
sl(S) ≤ sl(O)
Example 2. Referring the same scenario in Example 1, sl(Alice) = TS:{bio}
and sl(O1) = TS:{bio, chem}. Then Alice can write to O1 as sl(Alice) ≤ sl(O1).

Figure 2.2. Lattice structure (Kim, 2020)

Example 3. The diagram in Figure 2.2 depicts the partial ordering (≤) over
the MLS security levels as a lattice. Assuming Bob is granted a security
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clearance TS:{}, namely, sl(Bob) = TS:{} and Frank is granted a security
clearance S:{}, namely, sl(Frank) = S:{}. Two objects, O2 is classified as TS:{},
namely, sl(O2) = TS:{}, and O3 is classified as S:{}, namely, sl(O3) = S:{}.
Compare the security labels between the subjects and the objects. Between Bob
and O2, sl(Bob) = TS:{} = sl(O2), Bob can read and write O2. Similarly, since
sl(Frank) = S:{} = sl(O3), Frank can read and write to O3. As sl(Bob) = TS:{} is
higher than sl(O3) = S:{}, Bob can only read O3. Bob will be blocked from writing
to O3 because information cannot flow from high to low. As S:{} ≤ TS:{}, Frank
can write to O2 but not read O2.
Example 4. Attaching compartments to sensitivity level gives more
flexibility to information classification in a complex information system. Figure 2.2
shows that there is no partial ordering between TS:{} and S:{bio} (i.e., they are
not comparable). This means that no operation such as read or write should be
performed between them.

Multi-Level Security
The lattice structure of MLS with BLP model (Figure 2.3) is formed with
vertices connected by edges. The model distinguished two sets of vertices with
different colors by their hierarchy levels. Each security label (SL(si, ci)) has two
components, sensitivity level Si and compartment Ci. Sensitivity level is
hierarchically defined with a range from high to low, “Top Secret”  “Secret” 
“Classified”  “Unclassified”. Compartment is defined as {Bio, Nuke} ⊇ {Bio} |
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{Nuke} ⊇ {}. Vertices in red area are labels with “Top Secret” clearance (noted as
TS) and vertices in orange labels with “Secret” clearance (noted as S). (Kim,
2020)

Figure 2.3. Lattice Model (Kim, 2020)

Example 5. Based on Figure 2.3, “Top Secret” TS_{} is considered a
higher classification than “Secret” S_{}. TS_{} can read S_{} because information
is allowed to flow from a lower classification (“Secret”) to a higher classification
(“Top Secret”). Inversely, it prohibits S_{} read up to TS_{} to prevent information
leaking from higher classification to lower classification. Meanwhile, S_{} can
write up to TS_{} but TS_{} cannot write down to S_{}.
Moreover, the BLP model does not grant users with “Top Secret”
clearance to access all objects. With additional need-to-know restriction, known
as compartment (Example 6), to block irrelevant users from accessing
confidential information. (Denning, 1976; Panossian, 2019)
9

Example 6. Based on Figure 2.3, assuming Mary with security clearance
TS_{} is trying to read/write the object file with security classification S_{Nuke}.
Mary passes the first criteria because she has a “Top Secret” clearance which is
higher than the object file classification. However, she also needs a compartment
{Nuke} to meet the second criteria. {} can not grant her access to objects with
{Nuke}. This example explains how the need-to-know condition is applied to
provide an extra layer of protection to the information system.
In this project, the mathematical notation used to define a security label
such as SL(Si,Cj) is also expressed in terms of SL(TS_{Bio,Chem}) or SL(TS,
{Bio,Chem}). To examine if there is a dominance relationship between two
security label variables, both dominance rules must be satisfied. Once the
dominance relationship exists, the two BLP properties can be easily applied to
complete the MLS policies based on this relationship.
In addition, the lattice structure specifies the path of information flow
according to the dominance relationship between the vertices through the edges.
(Panossian, 2019) To block information leaking from higher classification to lower
classification (Figure 2.4), MLS enforces simple security property and star
property. Example 7 and Example 8 each will discuss the scenarios how each
BLP property ensures the information flow from lower classification to higher
classification. These examples will illustrate the rules to identify if a subject (S)
can read/write an object (O) based on their security labels.
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Figure 2.4. Information Flow with BLP (Kim, 2020)

Example 7. Assuming a person A (si) has the security clearance S_{Bio}
and an object (oi) with the classification TS_{Bio, Nuke}, s cannot read o because
SL(si) ≤ SL(oj). However, si can read any object when SL(si) ≥ SL(oj). For
instance, SL(oj) equal to S_{Bio} and SL(ok) equal to S_{}. (Kim, 2020)

Example 8. Assuming every variable has the same security label as
shown in Example 7, person (si) can now write to oi and oj because SL(si) ≤ SL(oj),
which allow information to flow from lower level security clearance to higher level
security clearance. However, person A will not be able to write to o j as well as
ok.(Kim, 2020)
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Intro to the Semantic Web and Technologies

Figure 2.5. The Layers of Semantic Web Technology

Semantic Web is an extension of the current world wide web standardized
by the W3C. Its goal is to make the implicit meaning of data to be explicitly
represented, so that the data is machine-readable to improve information
retrieval and produce more useful work. Some of the semantic web technologies
(Figure 2.5), RDF, OWL, SWRL and Protégé, are used in this project and each
will be given a brief introduction.
RDF
Resource Description Framework (RDF) is a fundamental block of the
semantic web built on top of HTML, HTTP, and XML to express the semantic
meaning of knowledge. The resource can be anything and must be uniquely
identified and referenced via Internalized Resource Identifier (IRI). Knowledge is
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expressed in a list of statements called triple, which follows a simple schema with
three components, subject, property and object. In RDF, the subject and the
property must be IRI, and the object of the triple can be either an IRI or a literal
(datatype).
OWL
The W3C Web Ontology Language (OWL) is a Semantic Web language
designed to represent rich and complex knowledge based on description logics
to describe classes, individuals and properties. It transfers the common
knowledge of philosophy and mathematics into a formal language in the form of
RDF to give semantic meaning, so that the knowledge becomes machine
understandable. The goal of building an OWL ontology is to create a model that
represents a subject of matter with individual things, kinds of things, and kinds of
relationships, as well as support automated reasoning. A class represents things
of an interest group, an individual is an instance of a class, and a property
defines the relationship between subjects and objects. Description logic
separates terminological knowledge base to assertional knowledge base.
Terminological knowledge base describes the relationships between classes
when defining the model and assertional knowledge describes how individuals
are related to each other.
Semantic Rule Language (SWRL)
SWRL combines OWL ontology and DataLog expressions that apply
DataLog rules to OWL ontologies in the form of “If…then…” statements. SWRL
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rules are in the form of “Antecedent -> Consequent”. The term “Antecedent” is
also referred to rule body and “Consequent” is referred to rule head. (O’Connor
et al., 2005) The body represents the “If…” statement and the head represents
the “then…” statement. An example SWRL rule can be:
SecurityLabel(?a) ^ SecurityLabel(?b) ^ sameAs(?a,?b) -> read(?a,?b)
This example explains the rule states that “If two security label a is equal
to security label b, then a can read b.” For the implementation of BLP in chapter
4, such rules will be created to apply the read/write relationship between subjects
and objects. Each will be discussed and shown output of implementation.
Without SWRL, the ontology can still be implemented by manually created
assertions in the editor. However, if an ontology has hundreds of assertions for a
small ontology to made to represent the knowledge without using an inference
engine, it is very inefficient for manually processing data. SWRL provides
automated reasoning functions. The inference engine can finish the work of
creating inference assertions in milliseconds. Moreover, modification of an
individual can cause modification of several assertions. SWRL can carry the rest
of the modification to improve work efficiency. Several studies have shown that
using SWRL can improve business process management. According to Abadi,
Ben-Azza, Sekkat (2018), SWRL is the only tool which gathers the ontology to
model the information and model decision making rules for industrial
applications. Matsokis and Kiristsis also suggested using SWRL to extend the
OWL models to develop a learnable approach in production management. (2011)
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Furthermore, Roy, Dayan and Holla presented that it supports business
knowledge management in industrial business processes. (2018)
Protégé
Protégé is an open-source ontology editor developed by Stanford Center
for Biomedical Informatics Research at the Stanford University School of
Medicine. This tool is widely used by academic, government, and corporate
groups. It complies with W3C standards, has visualization support and extensive
build-in tools to support ontology construction. According to Rubin et
al.(2005),Protégé provides a variety of features to support developers in creating,
modifying and managing ontologies:
•

Simple and customizable user interface

•

Support collaboration work

•

Visual support for ontology expressions

•

Built-in reasoners for checking consistency and inference engine

•

Multiple formats for exporting ontology to other platforms

•

Web version compatible to desktop version
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CHAPTER THREE
MODELING MULTI-LEVEL SECURITY IN OWL
This chapter will demonstrate the steps of building MLS ontology in
Protégé.
The three key components of OWL ontology are classes, properties and
individuals. To distinguish each component, this project uses the following
naming conventions without spaces:
1. Classes: upper camel cases (e.g., Person, Animal, Food)
2. Properties: lower camel cases (e.g., isGreaterThan, hasPet, movesTo)
3. Individuals: leading underscore (e.g., _JohnSmith, _Dog, _Pizza)

Building MLS Ontology
Step 1. Create Classes
The implementation starts with defining the terminological knowledge.
Previously, Chapter two discussed that a security label has two components,
sensitivity level and compartment. The first step is to create three classes,
SecurityLabel, SensitivityLevel, Compartment and their subclasses. Refer to the
lattice structure in Figure 2.2, each node will be a subclass of SecurityLabel. A
security label has two components, sensitivity level and compartment. TopSecret
and Secret are subclasses of SensitivityLevel; and BioNuke, Bio, Nuke,
Null(represents { }) are subclasses of Compartment. Because OWL uses open
world reasoning, it means if two classes are not specified to be different types of
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things, they are unknown to be different and allow to have intersections. To say
that there are no common members in SecurityLabel, SensitivityLevel and
Compartment, these three classes are disjoint to each other. It means that one
individual cannot be an instance of more than one of the three. Protégé allows
users to create a list of classes and indicates disjointness by using the Create
Class Hierarchy tool. To verify the implementation, select a random class to view
in the bottom of the Class Description. All sibling classes of the selected class
should be shown in the Disjoint With section.
In addition, at the same class hierarchy level as SecurityLabel,
SensitivityLevel and Compartment, two more disjoint classes, Subject and Object
are created for implementation in the next chapter. Table 1 shows the full list of
classes with class hierarchy levels.

Table 1. Create Classes and Subclasses
Class
Compartment

SensitivityLevel

SecurityLabel

Subclass
Bio
BioNuke
Nuke
Null
TopSecret
Secret
Confidential
Unclassfied
TS_BioNuke
TS_Bio
TS_Nuke
TS_Null
S_BioNuke
S_Bio
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Class

Subclass
S_Nuke
S_Null

Subject
Object

Step 2. Create Object Properties and Inverse Properties
The second step is to define the binary relationships (properties) between
entities. Table 2 shows how common knowledge is converted into RDF triple and
property for MLS ontology:

Table 2. Convert the Knowledge into RDF Triple and Property
Knowledge
A security label consists of
one sensitivity level.
A security label consists of
one compartment
The compartment BioNuke
has subset Bio or Nuke.
The (sensitivity level) Top
Secret is greater than
(sensitivity level) Secret.
A Subject has one security
label.
Security label TS_{Bio}
dominates security label
S_{Bio}.
Security label TS_{Bio}
cannot compare to security
label S_{Nuke}.
A Subject can read an
Object
A Subject can write to an
Object

RDF Triple
SecurityLabel
hasSensitivityLevel
SensitivityLevel.
SecurityLabel
hasCompartment
Compartment.
BioNuke hasSubset (Bio or
Nuke)
TopSecret isGreaterThan
Secret

Property
hasSensitivityLevel

Subject hasSecurityLabel
SecurityLabel.
TS_Bio dominates S_Bio.

hasSecurityLabel

TS_Bio isIncomparableTo
S_Nuke.

isIncomparableTo

Subject canRead Object.

canRead

Subject canWrite Object

CanWrite
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hasCompartment

hasSubset
isGreaterThan

Dominates

There are two types of RDF property. The first type is object property
which links individuals to individuals, and the second type is datatype property
which links individuals to RDF datatypes (e.g. string, integer, date, etc.). In this
MLS ontology, all properties are object properties.
Properties have characteristics. In Protégé(Figure 3.1), it is very easy to
specify the characteristics of the property. The transitive characteristic will be
specified in three properties, hasSubset, isGreaterThan and dominates. These
properties have the characteristics that if X is related to Y and Y is related to Z,
then X is related to Z. It is not necessary to add an assertion to state that X is
related to Z. The inference engine can generate the inferred axioms if the
property characteristics are specified.
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f
Figure 3.1. Apply Transitive Characteristic to isGreaterThan

Protégé also gives the option to define the domain and the range of
properties with the same meaning in mathematics. Given two individuals are
connected by a property in an RDF triple. The domain class specified that the
subject of the triple belongs to the domain class as well as the object of the triple
belongs to the range class.
Table 3 lists the domain and range is listed for each property. Take the
hasSensitivityLevel as an example, the domain of this property is SecurityLabel,
and the range is SensitivityLevel. Whenever a triple assertion contains
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hasSensitivityLevel, the subject of this triple should be an instance of
SecurityLabel, and the object should be an instance of SensitivityLevel.
With the specification of property domain and range as well as class
disjointness, the built-in Protégé reasoner Pallet can catch inconsistent
assertions which conflict with the description logic expressed in the model. The
reasoner can catch inconsistent assertions such as A (instance of SecurityLabel)
hasSensitivityLevel B (instance of Compartment), or A (instance of
Compartment) hasSensitivityLevel B (instance of SensitivityLevel).

Table 3. List of Property Domain and Range
Object Property
hasSensitivityLevel
hasCompartment
hasSubset
isGreaterThan
dominates
isIncomparableTo
canRead
canWrite

Domain
SecurityLabel
SecurityLabel
Compartment
SensitivityLevel
SecurityLabel
SecurityLabel
Subject
Subject

Range
SensitivityLevel
Compartment
Compartment
SensitivityLevel
SecurityLabel
SecurityLabel
Object
Object

Each object property can have its inverse property. In an RDF triple, the
property links the subject to the object in one direction. Its inverse property
applies this relationship from an opposite perspective. For example, if A is linked
to B through property P, the inverse way of saying the same thing is that B is
linked to A through inverse property Pi. In Protégé, the inverse relationship
between P and Pi can be defined in the Property Description panel. To better
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support the rule inferences in the next chapter, an inverse property is created for
each object property (Table 4).

Table 4. Property and Inverse Property
Property (P)
hasSensitivityLevel
hasCompartment
hasSubset
isGreaterThan
dominates
isIncomparableTo
canRead
canWrite

Inverse Property (PI)
isSensitivityLevelOf
isCompartmentOf
isSubsetOf
isLessThan
isDominateBy
N/A
canBeReadBy
canBeWrittenBy

Step 3. Modeling Classes Expression with Property Restrictions
The third step is to apply property restrictions to model class expression.
Properties describe the relationship between individuals. It can also be used as a
special kind of class description to emphasize that all instances of the class must
satisfy the restriction. There are four types of property restrictions, existential,
universal, cardinality and value restrictions. To model the SecurityLabel class,
existential and universal restrictions will be used to define SecurityLabel and its
subclasses. Take TS_BioNuke (Figure 3.2) as example, the class must qualify
for two conditions:
1. The class must have a sensitivity label and the security label must be
TopSecret. (existential & universal)
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2. The class must have a compartment and the compartment must be
BioNuke. (existential & universal)
According to the two conditions, four new property restrictions are applied:
1. hasSensitivityLevel some TopSecret
2. hasSensitivityLevel only TopSecret
3. hasCompartment some BioNuke
4. hasCompartment only BioNuke
User can click the compartment of TS_BioNuke, BioNuke, Protégé will
redirect to class description of this class(Figure 3.3).

Figure 3.2. Security Label TS_BioNuke
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Figure 3.3. Compartment BioNuke

Moreover, the bellowing table is a list of the property restrictions applied to
each class.

Table 5. Property Restrictions of Each Class
Class
Compartment

SensitivityLevel

Subclass
BioNuke
Bio
Nuke
TopSecret
Secret
Confidential

SecurityLabel
TS_BioNuke

TS_Bio

Property Restrictions
hasSubset some (Bio or Nuke)
hasSubset some Null
hasSubset some Null
isGreaterThan some Secret
isGreaterThan some Confidential
isGreaterThan some Unclassified
hasSensitivityLevel some SensitivityLevel
hasCompartment some Compartment
hasSensitivityLevel some TopSecret
hasSensitivityLevel only TopSecret
hasCompartment some BioNuke
hasCompartment only BioNuke
hasSensitivityLevel some TopSecret
hasSensitivityLevel only TopSecret
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Class

Subclass

TS_Nuke

TS_Null

S_BioNuke

S_Bio

S_Nuke

S_Null

Subject
Object

Property Restrictions
hasCompartment some Bio
hasCompartment only Bio
hasSensitivityLevel some TopSecret
hasSensitivityLevel only TopSecret
hasCompartment some Nuke
hasCompartment only Nuke
hasSensitivityLevel some TopSecret
hasSensitivityLevel only TopSecret
hasCompartment some Null
hasCompartment only Null
hasSensitivityLevel some Secret
hasSensitivityLevel only Secret
hasCompartment some BioNuke
hasCompartment only BioNuke
hasSensitivityLevel some Secret
hasSensitivityLevel only Secret
hasCompartment some Bio
hasCompartment only Bio
hasSensitivityLevel some Secret
hasSensitivityLevel only Secret
hasCompartment some Nuke
hasCompartment only Nuke
hasSensitivityLevel some Secret
hasSensitivityLevel only Secret
hasCompartment some Null
hasCompartment only Null
hasSecurityLabel some SecurityLabel
hasSecurityLabel some SecurityLabel

Step 4. Create Individuals with Property Assertions
After modeling classes with property restrictions, we can then create
instances with property assertions. Table 6 shows a list of individuals with their
property assertions for each security label node of the lattice model.
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Table 6. Individuals with Property Assertion
Class

Individual

Property Assertions

BioNuke

_Compartment_BioNuke

Bio

_Compartment_Bio

hasSubset _Compartment_Bio
hasSubset _Compartment_Nuke
hasSubset _Compartment_Null

Nuke

_Compartment_Nuke

hasSubset _Compartment_Null

Null

_Compartment_Null

TopSecret

_SensitivityLevel_TopSecret

Secret

_SensitivityLevel_Secret

isGreaterThan _SensitivityLevel_Secret

TS_BioNuke _SecurityLabel_TS_BioNuke hasSensitivityLevel
_SensitivityLevel_TopSecret
hasCompartment _Compartment_BioNuke
TS_Bio
_SecurityLabel_TS_Bio
hasSensitivityLevel
_SensitivityLevel_TopSecret
hasCompartment _Compartment_Bio
TS_Nuke
_SecurityLabel_TS_Nuke
hasSensitivityLevel
_SensitivityLevel_TopSecret
hasCompartment _Compartment_Nuke
TS_Null
_SecurityLabel_TS_Null
hasSensitivityLevel
_SensitivityLevel_TopSecret
hasCompartment _Compartment_Null
S_BioNuke
_SecurityLabel_S_BioNuke
hasSensitivityLevel
_SensitivityLevel_Secret
hasCompartment _Compartment_BioNuke
S_Bio
_SecurityLabel_S_Bio
hasSensitivityLevel
_SensitivityLevel_Secret
hasCompartment _Compartment_Bio
S_Nuke
_SecurityLabel_S_Nuke
hasSensitivityLevel
_SensitivityLevel_Secret
hasCompartment _Compartment_Nuke
S_Null
_SecurityLabel_S_Null
hasSensitivityLevel
_SensitivityLevel_Secret
hasCompartment _Compartment_Null
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Till this step, the security label modeling has completed. The ontology
modeling constructs terminology assertions are applied to classes with property
restrictions. Assertional knowledge is represented with individuals. For testing
purposes, select Compartment individual _Compartment_Bio and add an object
property assertion to represent _Compartment_Bio isGreaterThan
_Compartment_Null. Running Pellet reasoner, an inconsistentOntologyException
error message popped up because Protégé explains (Figure 3.2) that the domain
and range of isGreaterThan are limited to SensitivityLevel, which is disjoint to
Compartment. The test assertion conflicts with the specified domain and range
classes of isGreaterThan. This test shows the reasoner’s capability of catching
inconsistency errors. Reasoner can be used to detect the modeling errors at any
step.

Figure 3.4. Protégé Inconsistent Ontology Explanation
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CHAPTER FOUR
SWRL RULE IMPLEMENTATION FOR MAC AND BLP

Apply Dominance Rule
This section uses a Semantic Web Rule Language (SWRL) to apply
dominance rules to the MLS ontology. SWRL combines OWL and DataLog
expressions in the form of Horn-like rules to express “If …, then …” statements.
The SWRL inference engine checks the set of predefined rules to apply the
relationship to the matching variables. Therefore, any modification of the
ontology will automatically update the inferred axioms by SWRL. The purpose of
using SWRL is not only to use it as an inference engine, but also SWRL can
transfer the inferred axioms to the OWL model to make them explicitly
represented. The ontology (with inferred axioms made by inference engine) can
be exported to be reviewed in simple text editor or other semantic tools.
For a pair of security labels, the dominates relationship is not directly
asserted. Refer to the dominance rule discussed in Chapter 2, two security labels
can be compared for dominance:
An MLS system has a dominance rule that defines a partial order (≤) over
the MLS security levels. The partial ordering (≤) is always defined such that two
security levels can be compared for dominance:
Given two security levels L1 = S1:C1 and L2 = S2:C2, we write L1 ≤ L2,
meaning L1 is dominated by (less than) L2 or L2 dominates (is greater than) L1
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when
• S2 is a higher sensitivity level than S
• C1 is a subset of C2, namely, C1 ⊆ C2
Property dominates and its inverse property isDominatedBy are used to
represent the dominance relationship between the security labels. Convert the
mathematical notation into SWRL, the following rules are created:
Rule 1:
S1 - Compare two security labels L1 = S1:C1 and L2 = S2:C2, if S1 = S2, C2
has subset C1, then L2 dominates L1.
SecurityLabel(?L1) ^ hasSensitivityLevel(?L1,?S1) ^ hasCompartment(?L1,?C1) ^
SecurityLabel(?L2) ^ hasSensitivityLevel(?L2,?S2) ^ hasCompartment(?L2,?C2) ^
sameAs(?S1,?S2) ^ hasSubset(?C1,?C2) -> dominates(?L1,?L2)

Rule 2:
S2- Compare two security labels L1 = S1:C1 and L2 = S2:C2, if S2 is greater
than S1, C2 has subset C1, then L2 dominates L1.
SecurityLabel(?L1) ^ hasSensitivityLevel(?L1,?S1) ^ hasCompartment(?L1,?C1) ^
SecurityLabel(?L2) ^ hasSensitivityLevel(?L2,?S2) ^ hasCompartment(?L2,?C2) ^
isGreaterThan(?S1,?S2) ^ hasSubset(?C1,?C2) -> dominates(?L1,?L2)

Rule 3:
S3. Compare two security labels L1 = S1:C1 and L2 = S2:C2, if S2 is greater
than S1, C2 = C1, then L2 dominates L1.
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SecurityLabel(?L1) ^ hasSensitivityLevel(?L1,?S1) ^ hasCompartment(?L1,?C1) ^
SecurityLabel(?L2) ^ hasSensitivityLevel(?L2,?S2) ^ hasCompartment(?L2,?C2) ^
isGreaterThan(?S2,?S1) ^ sameAs(?C1,?C2) -> dominates(?L2,?L1)

Testing MLS Ontology with Mandatory Access Control Criteria
This section demonstrates scenario tests to use SWRL queries to detect
comparable security label pairs (Figure 4.1) and incomparable security label
pairs (Figure 4.3) to verify if the MLS lattice model is correctly implemented. The
SWRL queries can be executed in the SQWRLTab in Protégé to extract
information from both asserted and inferred axioms generated by the SWRL
inference engine.
Test Scenario 1 (Comparable Security Labels)
Query 1:
SQ1 - Show all pairs of security labels with dominates relationships by
ascending order.
SecurityLabel(?L1) ^ SecurityLabel(?L2) ^ dominates(?L1,?L2) ->
sqwrl:select(?L1,?L2) ^ sqwrl:orderBy(?L1,?L2)

The SQ1 query represents that if there exists a dominates relationship
between two variables L1 and L2, then select all matching pairs from the
database and output L1 then L2 in ascending order. The domain and range of
property dominates are pre-defined, therefore, the dominates relationship only
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exists in pairs of SecurityLabel instances. Run the query and the result is shown
in Figure 4.1.

.
Figure 4.1. List of All Comparable Security Label Pairs
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To see the dominates relationship applies to a specific security label, for
example, _SecurityLabel_TS_Bio, a test query SQ2 below can show all security
label instances which are dominated by it.
Query 2:
SQ2 - Show All Comparable Security Labels which are dominated by
_SecurityLabel_TS_Bio
dominates(_SecurityLabel_TS_Bio, ?L) -> sqwrl:select(?L)

Figure 4.2. List of Comparable Security Labels of _SecurityLabel_TS_Bio

In Figure 4.2, three security label instances are returned. In lattice model
(Figure 2.3), even the node TS{Bio} is not directly linked to the node S{Null}, but
it dominates nodes TS{Null} and S{Bio}, which both dominate S{Null}. The
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inference engine refers to the dominates property’s transitivity characteristics to
make a inferred axiom that TS{Bio} dominates S{Null}.
Test Scenario 2 (Incomparable Security Labels)
In lattice model, even though the compartment {Bio} and {Nuke} are both
subset of compartment {Bio,Nuke}. In this test, an object property
isIncomparableTo represents the incomparable relationship between
_Compartment_Bio and _Compartment_Nuke. Rule S4 will be used to create
incomparable relationship between two security labels if their compartments are
incomparable, and SQ3 is the query to show all security label pairs which has
incomparable relationship. The result of SQ3 is shown in Figure 4.3.
Rutle 4:
S4 - Compare two security labels L1 = S1:C1 and L2 = S2:C2, if C1 and C2
are incomparable, then L1 and L2 are incomparable.
SecurityLabel(?L1) ^ hasCompartment(?L1, ?C1) ^ SecurityLabel(?L2) ^
hasCompartment(?L2, ?C2) ^ isIncomparableTo(?C1, ?C2) ->
isIncomparableTo(?L1, ?L2)

Query 3:
SQ3 - Show all incomparable security label pairs.
SecurityLabel(?L1) ^ SecurityLabel(?L2) ^ isIncomparableTo(?L1, ?L2) ->
sqwrl:select(?L1, ?L2) ^ sqwrl:orderBy(?L1, ?L2)
Compare the result of SQ3 (Figure 4.3) to the result of SQ1 (Figure 4.1).
There is no same pair of security labels in both queries’ results. Hence, the
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implementation shows that no MAC criteria are violated. The assumption can be
made that if two security labels are not comparable, then no dominates
relationship exists between them.

Figure 4.3. List of Incomparable Security Labels

SWRL Rules for BLP Implementation within a Single Domain
This section demonstrates the BLP models to apply the simple security
property and the star property to subjects (S) and objects (O), each with its own
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security label. In Protégé, create a list of new Individuals with Assertions shown
in Table 7.

Table 7. Subject and Object Individuals with Assertions
Class
Subject

Object

Individual
_Subject_1
_Subject_2
_Subject_3
_Subject_4
_Subject_5
_Subject_6
_Subject_7
_Subject_8
_Object_1
_Object_2
_Object_3
_Object_4
_Object_5
_Object_6
_Object_7
_Object_8

Assertion
hasSecurityLabel
hasSecurityLabel
hasSecurityLabel
hasSecurityLabel
hasSecurityLabel
hasSecurityLabel
hasSecurityLabel
hasSecurityLabel
hasSecurityLabel
hasSecurityLabel
hasSecurityLabel
hasSecurityLabel
hasSecurityLabel
hasSecurityLabel
hasSecurityLabel
hasSecurityLabel

_SecurityLabel_S_BioNuke
_SecurityLabel_TS_Null
_SecurityLabel_S_Bio
_SecurityLabel_TS_Bio
_SecurityLabel_TS_Nuke
_SecurityLabel_S_Null
_SecurityLabel_TS_BioNuke
_SecurityLabel_S_Nuke
_SecurityLabel_S_Nuke
_SecurityLabel_S_Null
_SecurityLabel_TS_Bio
_SecurityLabel_TS_Null
_SecurityLabel_S_BioNuke
_SecurityLabel_S_Bio
_SecurityLabel_TS_BioNuke
_SecurityLabel_TS_Nuke

Simple Security Property
The “no read up” policy states that a subject (S) at a security level (sl(S))
may not read an object (O) if the security level (sl(O)) of the object is higher than
the security level(sl(S)) of the subject. So the subject can read the object when:
sl(O) ≤ sl(S)
Therefore, canRead can utilize the pre-defined dominates relationship
between security labels. R5 defines that if the security label of the subject SL
dominates the security label of the object, then the subject can read the object. In
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addition, R6 defines that if the subject’s security label is equal to object’s security
label, then they exist canRead relationship, and RQ4 queries a complete list of
canRead relationships in this ontology(Figure 3.7).
Rule 5:
S5 - If sl(S) dominates sl(O), then sl(S) canRead sl(O). This rule
expresses that if the subject has higher classification than the object, then apply
the canRead relationship between these two variables.
Subject(?S) ^ Object(?O) ^ hasSecurityLabel(?S,?SL) ^
hasSecurityLabel(?S,?OL) ^ dominates(?SL,?OL) -> canRead(?S,?O)

Rule 6:
S6. If sl(S) = sl(O), then sl(S) canRead sl(O). This rule expresses that if
the subject and the object have the same classification, then apply canRead
relationship to these two variables.
Subject(?S) ^ Object(?O) ^ hasSecurityLabel(?S,?SL) ^
hasSecurityLabel(?O,?OL) ^ sameAs(?SL,?OL) -> canRead(?S,?O)

Query 4:
SQ4 - Show the list of canRead Objects of each Subject , both with their
security labels in order of the Subject, then by the Object (Figure 4.4).
Subject(?S) ^ Object(?O) ^ hasSecurityLabel(?S, ?SL) ^
hasSecurityLabel(?O, ?OL) ^ canRead(?S, ?O) -> sqwrl:select(?S, ?SL, ?O,
?OL) ^ sqwrl:orderBy(?S,?O)
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Figure 4.4 Query Result of SQ4

To verify the implementation, the Example 1 in Chapter 2 states that a
subject with security clearance TS:{bio} cannot read the object with security
classification TS:{bio,chem} because they both have top secret sensitivity level
,but the compartment of the object is higher than (hasSubset) the subject’s. In
the ontology, the minor difference is that this project uses {bio, nuke} instead of
{bio,chem}. The consumption is verified that the subject with
_SecurityLabel_TS_Bio can only read the objects with four types of security
clearances: _SecurityLabel_TS_Bio, _SecurityLabel_TS_Null,
_SecurityLabel_S_Bio and _SecurityLabel_S_Null.
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Example 5 also discussed the scenario that a subject with clearance TS_{}
can read the object with classification S_{}. There is a matching record in Figure
4.4 shows that _Subject_2 (hasSecurityLabel _SecurityLabel_TS_Null) canRead
_Object_2 (hasSecurityLabel _SecurityLabel_S_Null).

* (Star) Property
The “no write-down” policy states that a subject at a given security level
may not write to any object at a lower security level. The canWrite relationship
exists when sl(S) ≤ sl(O). canWrite utilize the dominates in the inverse way of
canRead:
Rule 7:
S7 - If sl(O) dominates sl(S), then sl(S) canWrite sl(O). This rule
expresses that if the classification of the object dominates (lower than) the
clearance of the subject, then apply the canWrite relationship to these two
variables.
Subject(?S) ^ Object(?O) ^ hasSecurityLabel(?S, ?SL) ^
hasSecurityLabel(?O, ?OL) ^ isDominatedBy(?SL, ?OL) -> canWrite(?S, ?O)

Rule 8:
S8 - If sl(S) = sl(O), then sl(S) canWrite sl(O). This rule expresses that if
the subject and the object have equal classification, then apply the canWrite
relationship to these two variables.
Subject(?S) ^ Object(?O) ^ hasSecurityLabel(?S,?SL) ^
hasSecurityLabel(?O,?OL) ^ sameAs(?SL,?OL) -> canWrite(?S,?O)
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Query 5:
SQ5 - Show the list of canWrite Objects of each Subject , both with their
security labels in order of the Subject, then by the Object (Figure 4.5).

Figure 4.5. Query Result for SQ5
Look at Figure 4.5, shows all pairs of canWrite relationships which apply
to the combination of subject and object variables. Each record shows a subject
with a lower or equal clearance canWrite the object with a higher or equal
classification. The following three records improve the hypotheses discussed in
Example 2., Example 3. and Example 7:
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1.

_Subject_4 with _SecurityLabel_TS_Bio canWrite _Object_7 with

_SecurityLabel_TS_BioNuke.
2.

_Subject_6 (hasSecurityLabel _SecurityLabel_S_Null) canWrite

_object_4 (hasSecurityLabel __SecurityLabel_TS_Null)
3.

_Subject_3 (hasSecurityLabel _SecurityLabel_S_Bio) canWrite

_object_7 (hasSecurityLabel __SecurityLabel_TS_BioNuke)
Additional Notes for Implementation
Unlike other query languages of Protégé, SWRL queries only extract the
information from assertional knowledge (relationships between individuals). It is
very important to make sure the actual assertions are made for each individual.
In OWL, it’s not wrong to leave the object property assertions blank, but the
inference engine cannot make any inferred assertion without assertional
knowledge input. For example, to apply dominance rule S1 with two given
variables L1 (_SecurityLabel_TS_Bio) and L2(_SecurityLabel_TS_Null). Each
must be explicitly defined with sensitivity level and compartment. If L1 does not
have a clear classification of its compartment C1, even it has a compartment
instance Bio on terminology side, but in the rule the two conditions hasCompartment(?L1,?C1) and has Subset(?C1,?C2) are not fulfilled.
SecurityLabel(?L1) ^ hasSensitivityLevel(?L1,?S1) ^ hasCompartment(?L1,?C1) ^
SecurityLabel(?L2) ^ hasSensitivityLevel(?L2,?S2) ^ hasCompartment(?L2,?C2) ^
sameAs(?S1,?S2) ^ hasSubset(?C1,?C2) -> dominates(?L1,?L2)
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CHAPTER FIVE
CONCLUSION
This project set an experimental solution for MLS policy in OWL by
leveraging semantic web technologies and concepts. The proposed methodology
consists of three stages. The first stage is modeling security level follows the
MLS concepts. The second stage uses semantic web rule language to apply
dominance rules adhering to MAC criteria. The third stage implements the
ontology with BLP properties within a single domain. Test queries verify that
classified information can only be accessed by authorized users. The results
indicate that the MLS policy can be adopted within semantic web infrastructure.
According to the Semantic Scholar, this ontology is the first MLS practice
in research studies. It has potentials for organizations to apply this security policy
to protect sensitive data.

Future Work
Semantic web also allows connection to multiple ontologies in different
domains. The future work can extend the current implementation to MLS multidomain access control with trust agreement. This will build an extra layer of
protection when sharing data across the organizations.
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